人工智能所具有的变革性力量正挑战着传统版权法中作者身份认定的理论范式,当下将人工智能主体性与作者身份之间等量齐观的做法尤值反思。确认作者身份实际上是版权机制实现创造资源倾斜性分配的有效社会组织手段,是赋予不同人格主体以实际资格身份的一种分配技术。版权法中的作者身份并非“浪漫主义”作者观的简单投射,而是包含后结构主义与关系型作者理论参与建构的结果,其重在强调作者之于作品的本源性意蕴,并突出了自身的社会建构价值和鼓励文化交流与社会互动之功能。人工智能作者身份的“浪漫化”忽视了作者概念的人性要素及其独特的社会意义;后结构主义理论着力于作者身份的符号化,以解构与消除作者身份中的传统要素,因此其无法用来实现人工智能作者身份的理论证成;因人工智能不能满足关系型作者关于文化对话与意义交换的社会主体定位,亦排除成为作者的可能。对人工智能“作者”身份问题的本质澄清与反思,将有助人工智能时代版权法回归以人为本的制度逻辑。

The transformative power of artificial intelligence (AI) is redefining the respective roles of humans and machines in the creative process and challenging the theoretical paradigm of authorship in traditional copyright law. The current practice of equating AI subjectivity with authorship based on abstract logical deduction is particularly worthy of reflection. In fact, confirming the author identity is actually an effective social organizational means for the copyright mechanism to realize the tilted distribution of creative resources, and it is a distribution technology that provides actual qualifications to different personality subjects. Through the general legal definition of abstract subject qualifications, it can be concluded that the authorship of AI is a logical error.
By systematically sorting out the historical genealogy of authorship ideology, this article believes that authorship in copyright law is not a simple projection of the “romantic” view of authorship, but the result of the participation of post-structuralism and relational authorship theory. It emphasizes the original meaning of the author to the work, and highlights its own symbolic construction value and its function of encouraging cultural exchanges and social interaction. The “romanticization” of AI authorship ignores the human element of the author concept and its ethical characteristics that serve the just value of copyright distribution; poststructuralist theory is not entirely motivated by the disenchantment of the romantic author myth, but focuses on the symbolization of the author identity to deconstruct and eliminate the traditional elements of authorship and break the established consensus of copyright law. Therefore, it cannot be used to realize the theoretical justification of AI authorship, because AI cannot meet the social subject position of relational authors on cultural dialogue and meaning exchange, and cannot participate in the network of human social relations, excluding the possibility of becoming an author.
This article expandsprevious literaturein the following two aspects. First, it strictly distinguishes the subjectivity of AI from the confirmation of identity qualifications, and uses authorship in copyright law as a unique research perspective and analysis toolto judge the reasonableness of AI's authorship status in copyright law. Second, it places the legal concept of authorship in copyright law within the context of dynamic social construction, reveals the different historical genealogies of authorship ideologies in copyright law, and uses this as a theoretical premise to evaluate the appropriateness of AI authorship.
This article scientifically grasps the essential connotation of authorship in the evolution of the concept of authorship in copyright law, systematically refutes various theoretical tendencies on the issue of authorship in AI, and lays an important foundationof methodology and normative theory for the scientific understanding and explanation of authorship in the era of AI. This will help copyright law return to the people-centered institutional logic and serve the great mission of promoting human creative progress and the prosperity of human cultural undertakings.