根据生态工业园建设的原则,采用博弈分析方法,对园区内同类企业、不同类企业、企业与政府间的多种利益博弈格局进行分析,并结合广州开发区的实践,探讨相关解决措施及建议。对同类企业来讲(排污,排污)构成一个博弈的纳什均衡,更加倾向于不合作。不同类(异质)企业更趋向于合作,在博弈格局中,会选择(合作,合作)的获利结果,同时环境不会受到污染。只有企业在选择排污策略时,政府与企业之间的博弈关系才存在,这是个不确定性的动态博弈,这种博弈和纯粹的经济活动博弈不同的是,处罚的结果可暂时保持企业正常盈利水平和公众不被污染的环境质量。

In accordance with eco-industrial park construction principles,this research makes use of game theory to analyze a variety of interests' Game pattern between similar enterprises,different enterprises and enterprises-governments respectively.combined with the practice of Guangzhou Development industrial park,it discussed the solutions and made corresponding advice.To similar enterprises,the (pollute) constitutes a Nash equilibrium,and more inclined to uncooperative.Different categories (heterogeneous) enterprises tended to be more cooperative in the game pattern,will choose (cooperate).And the environment will not be polluted.Only companies choose the polluting strategy,between the government and enterprises Game relationship does exist.This is a dynamic game of uncertainties.This game is different from purely economic activities because the punishment may be the consequence of temporary maintaining a normal level of profitability and unpolluted public environment quality.