自上而下为调动基层公务员积极性,做了很多正向激励的努力,如职级并行、考核奖励、“制造流动”等等,但基层公务员工作积极性不高的问题仍然普遍存在,基层公务员存在激励困境,本文旨在探讨该困境生成的内在机理。基于中部A省某区直单位为期6年的观察发现,首先,体制内激励基层公务员的办法通常有精神奖励、物质奖励以及晋升激励。这三种奖励办法可以归结为两种不同的类型,即以晋升为奖励手段的内核激励,以及以物质和精神奖励为手段的边缘奖励。其次,由于奖励资源的稀缺性,实施奖励就必须具有程序上的公平依据,因此,考核是实施激励的重要补充。但吊诡的是,现实中考核往往并不是激励的依据,而是相反。再次,实施内核激励的真实依据是由基层公务员在体制内外关系资源的强弱建构的隐性晋升秩序,而边缘奖励则对该秩序中的弱势群体提供,作为一种平衡。因此基层普遍存在年度优秀公务员和晋升者不一致,以及晋升者的领导评价和同事风评不一致的现象。最后,隐形晋升秩序让内核激励和边缘激励效果出现了双降,本文将其总结为“关系消解激励”,并且当前的分配型体制正在强化县域的关系属性。

In the last few years, a lot of positive incentive efforts have been made to mobilize the enthusiasm of grassroots civil servants from top to bottom, such as parallel ranks, assessment, and rewards, “creating flow”, but the problem of low enthusiasm of grassroots civil servants is still widespread and there is an incentive dilemma for grassroots civil servants, so this paper aims to explore the internal mechanism of the dilemma.
Based on the field survey, participatory observation, and in-depth interviews, this paper clarifies the promotion phenomenon and logic of a district-level unit in A Province in the central region from 2017 to 2022.
The field survey shows that firstly, the methods of motivating grassroots civil servants usually include spiritual rewards, material rewards, and promotion incentives. However, in grassroots practice, these three types of incentives can be boiled down to two different types, namely, core incentives with promotion as a means of reward, and marginal rewards with material and spiritual rewards as the means. Secondly, due to the scarcity of reward resources, the implementation of rewards must have a procedural fair basis; therefore, assessment is an important supplement to the implementation of incentives. In reality, appraisal is often not the basis for incentives; on the contrary, an organization's promotion decisions profoundly affect the results of appraisals. Thirdly, the basis for the implementation of core incentives is the implicit promotion order constructed by the intensity of the relationship resources between grassroots civil servants inside and outside the system, while the marginal rewards are provided to the disadvantaged groups in the system as a balance. Therefore, there are inconsistencies between outstanding civil servants and promoters in a year, as well as inconsistencies between leaders' evaluation and the colleague evaluation of those who are promoted. Finally, the invisible promotion order reduces the effect of both core incentive and marginal incentive, which is summarized as “relational dissolution incentive”, and the current distribution-oriented system is strengthening the relational attribute of counties.
Compared with previous research on the promotion of grassroots civil servants, this paper has contributions in the following three aspects. Firstly, in the explanation of the promotion of grassroots civil servants, the key figures who affect the promotion are proposed, and the key people and the grassroots civil servants are connected by emotional or interest bonds. Secondly, the specific types of relationships that affect the promotion of grassroots civil servants are subdivided, that is, strong political relations, weak political but strong economic relations, and weak political and economic relationships, that is, the relationship is used as an analytical tool to discuss the promotion of civil servants. Thirdly, it clarifies the consequences of relational intervention in the promotion of civil servants, that is, “relational dissolution incentives”, including three different dissolution paths, namely, strong political relations replacing and even determining evaluation, strong economic but weak political relations weakening evaluation, and weak political and economic relations leading to incentive fail.