In recent years, as the compensation disparity among Chinese listed companies has continued to widen, an increasing number of executives enhance their value through mobility in the industry labor market, thereby strengthening the industry tournament incentive effect on executives. While industry tournament incentives can mitigate agency issues within companies, they might also elevate executive risk-taking behavior and earnings management tendencies, consequently influencing audit fees. However, scarce literature has explored the relationship between industry tournament incentives and audit fees.    Utilizing data from Chinese listed companies, this study employs the compensation gap between CEOs and the highest-paid CEOs in the industry as a measure of industry tournament incentives. It investigates the impact of industry tournament incentives on audit fees. Empirical findings reveal that companies characterized by strong industry tournament incentives tend to incur higher audit fees. This suggests that the stronger the industry labor market incentivizes CEO promotions, the higher the associated audit fees. Even after addressing endogeneity concerns, using alternative measures for industry tournament incentives, considering the influence of CFO industry tournament incentives, and accounting for the managerial entrenchment substitute hypothesis, the conclusions of this study remain robust.    Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the positive impact of industry tournament incentives on audit fees is more pronounced in companies with high industry homogeneity and CEOs not approaching retirement. This implies that when CEOs exhibit a strong willingness to participate in industry tournaments, the positive effect of industry tournament incentives on audit fees is amplified in such firms. The examination of influencing mechanisms reveals that the mediation of company risk levels and earnings management in the positive relationship between industry tournament incentives and audit fees suggests that such incentives elevate audit fees by heightening company risk profiles and the degree of earnings management.    This study contributes in several ways. Firstly, it bridges the gap between executive labor market incentives and audit pricing decisions by investigating whether industry labor market incentives for CEO promotions influence auditor pricing choices, thereby enriching both research domains. Secondly, the study findings unveil that auditor pricing decisions consider the impact of industry tournament incentives on executive risk behavior. Lastly, the paper provides theoretical groundwork and empirical evidence for the heterogeneity of the effects of industry tournament incentives on executive behavior and firm outcomes.    To a certain extent, this research elucidates how industry labor market incentives for executive promotions impact auditor pricing decisions, aiding listed companies in establishing sound executive compensation incentive mechanisms. This, in turn, reduces company risk levels and earnings management, subsequently mitigating audit risks and associated audit fees.