Research on Classified Reform and Incentive Mechanism of Executive Compensation in State-owned Enterprises

LI Yuqiao, CHEN Lin

Jinan Journal ›› 2020, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (4) : 14-25.

PDF(721 KB)
PDF(721 KB)
Jinan Journal ›› 2020, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (4) : 14-25.

Research on Classified Reform and Incentive Mechanism of Executive Compensation in State-owned Enterprises

  • LI Yuqiao, CHEN Lin
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Abstract

Based on the data of state-owned listed companies in CSMAR database, this paper uses fixed effect model analysis to test the impact of the performance of economic, social and political tasks of state-owned enterprises on their executive compensation. According to the different task objectives of state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises are divided into competitive and non-competitive categories, and the classified regression test is carried out. The results show that: the performance of economic tasks and social tasks of state-owned enterprises are conducive to the promotion of executive pay, while the performance of political tasks is irrelevant to executive pay. After classified assessment of state-owned enterprises, the performance of economic tasks of competitive state-owned enterprises is conducive to the promotion of executive pay, while the performance of social tasks is irrelevant to executive pay. The economic task performance and social task performance of non-competitive state-owned enterprises are helpful to improve the executive compensation. The incentive effect of classified assessment of state-owned enterprises is better than that of non-competitive state-owned enterprises. The research of this paper verifies the effectiveness of the classified assessment of state-owned enterprises, that is, the classified assessment of state-owned enterprises improves the evaluation and assessment system of state-owned enterprise executives, and improves the incentive effect of compensation for state-owned enterprise executives as a whole.

Key words

classified reform of state-owned enterprises / competitive state-owned enterprises / executive compensation incentive / mixed ownership reform / non-competitive state-owned enterprises

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LI Yuqiao, CHEN Lin. Research on Classified Reform and Incentive Mechanism of Executive Compensation in State-owned Enterprises. Jinan Journal. 2020, 42(4): 14-25
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